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The Central American Fear of Youth
Anika Oettler, Institute of Sociology, University of Marburg, Germany
It is often asserted that youth gangs and organized crime have seized Central America. For theories on contemporary Central American violence, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador and Nicaragua present important test cases, which demonstrate the need to differentiate the diagnosis. This paper is concerned with the social 
construction of violence-related national and transnational myths as a precondition for policy formulation. The notion of exploding youth violence is part of 
hegemonic discourses and not necessarily linked to lifeworld experiences. While discourses on youth violence differ from country to country, with varying 
threat levels, patterns of attention, and discursive leitmotifs, they share the monstrous image of brutal gangs (Mara Salvatrucha, Dieciocho) as the most 
vivid object of fear.
1. Introduction: An Explosion of Youth Violence in Central America?
In recent years, many scholars have examined violence and 
globalization, dealing with the “new paradigm of violence” 
(Wieviorka 2003) that has accompanied global social 
changes since the end of the Cold War. With regard to 
Latin America, there is a wealth of literature on the wave of 
criminal violence that has swept the continent.
Central America remains on the margins of international 
political life, but developments relating to crime, violence, 
and insecurity are attracting growing interest. It is often as-
serted that levels of violence in the region are as high as, or 
even higher than, during the state terror, insurgency, and 
war of the 1970s and 1980s. According to policy papers and 
academic studies, there are “two key areas of crime in 
which Central America is remarkable by global standards: 
the volumes of drugs trafficked through the region and the 
rate of murder” (UNODC 2007, 45). Even though there is 
scant evidence regarding “real” crime rates and per-
petrators (Huhn, Oettler, and Peetz 2008), the majority of 
crimes tend to be attributed to youth gangs (pandillas, 
maras). In recent years, the question of “How the Street 
Gangs took Central America” (Arana 2005) has evolved to 
become the center of public debates, thereby clouding the 
multifaceted character of violence. The most prominent 
phenomenon are the notorious street gangs Mara Sal-
vatrucha (MS-13) and Dieciocho (Calle 18/18th Street) 
that were formed in the Hispanic barrios of Los Angeles. 
When the U.S. government began deporting convicted cri-
minals “home,” the gang phenomenon spread to the war-
torn Central American societies, increasing massively from 
the mid-1990s onwards. Since then, media reports as well 
as policy papers have not ceased to perpetuate the domi-
nant image of the anomic adolescent other. Central Ameri-
can youth gangs are said to have metamorphosed into a 
hierarchical transnational criminal network, which is gen-
erally tied to the narcotics trade (Bruneau 2005; Johnson 
and Muhlhausen 2005; Manwaring 2007). These concerns 
tend to be mobilized and translated into policy agendas at 
global and domestic levels. Central American gangs are 
often seen as major challenges to state sovereignty (Bru-
neau 2011; Manwaring 2007). In the latest World Devel-
opment Report, they emerged as “major bugbears” (Jones 
and Rodgers 2011, 987) that represent the power of anomic 
social forces. It is crucial to note, however, that actual em-
pirical evidence on the criminal behavior of youth gangs 
has been provided for the local level (Rodgers 2006; DI-
RINPRO 2006) rather than the national or transnational 
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levels. In general, there is little consensus on the causes, 
logics, and structures of gang proliferation (Jones and 
Rodgers 2009). Academic debate is divided as to whether 
Central American youth gangs should be viewed as locally 
rooted groups or whether migration has accelerated the 
proliferation of transnational adolescent organized crime 
(Cruz 2010). Some authors argue that Central American 
gangs tend to replace the state in “providing micro-regimes 
of order” (Rodgers 2009, 964) in slums and poor neigh-
borhoods, attracting members with their cohesiveness, 
“gangsta” culture, and resistance identities (Hagedorn 
2008; Reguillo 2005; Liebel 2004). There is a lively debate 
about the scope and extent of illegal and violent collective 
behavior, while others have dealt with root causes of gang 
proliferation such as unemployment, migration, and social 
disintegration. However, the sub-field of gang studies faces 
serious problems of methodology. As Wolf notes (2010), 
much literature on Central American street gangs relies on 
anonymous sources, self-proclaimed experts, and media 
and police reports, and thus lacks a critical foundation. 
Findings vary greatly, ranging from dramatizing policy 
papers to naïve interpretations of gang culture. 
What does “mara” mean? It is important to note that 
“mara,” “pandilla,” and “youth gang” have evolved into 
confusing and sometimes euphemistic buzzwords. In gen-
eral, “pandilla” and “mara” are interchangeable Spanish 
terms for “youth gang.” However, politicians and mass 
media have been at the forefront of creating and disseminat-
ing the meaning of “mara.” The term is strongly associated 
with the Mara Salvatrucha and Dieciocho gangs, which 
should be labeled (adult) “street gangs” rather than “youth 
gangs.” Nevertheless, they are often fearfully associated with 
deviant adolescents. It is important to note that the as-
cription by others is not necessarily shared by gang 
members, who often describe themselves as “pandilleros.” 
When referring to domestic youth gangs, people in Nicara-
gua and Costa Rica mainly use the term “pandilla.” Finally, 
it should be mentioned that there is a persistent etymologi-
cal legend. While the term “mara” is often said to refer to “a 
type of ant known for its ferocity” (Manwaring 2007, 13; 
Bruneau 2011), myrmecologists’ use of the term does not 
relate to army ant species but rather to horror movies such 
as The Naked Jungle and Legion of Fire: Killer Ants.1
In all Central American societies, maras and pandillas are 
seen as a greater threat than ever before. However, we pre-
sume that this ever-present danger is, as in other cases, 
mainly a result of discursive practices. The high level of 
Central American criminal violence may be understood as 
a social fact, which is such, because it is commonly be-
lieved. Thus, the notion of exploding crime is part of a 
dominant ideological/discursive formation (Fairclough 
1995) and not necessarily linked to “real” threat levels or 
lifeworld experience. The Central American talk of juvenile 
delinquency shows how public discourses produce and re-
produce collective patterns of interpretation as well as sys-
tems of social rules. It is crucial to note that this seed of 
fear is nourished by a diverse pattern of discourse events 
that differs from country to country. 
This paper reports some results of an exploratory research 
project on “Public Spaces and Violence in Central Ameri-
ca,” carried out together with Peter Peetz and Sebastian 
Huhn between 2006 and 2009, with new observational data 
and supplemental material added. The research project 
deals with public discourses on violence and focuses on a 
wide range of hegemonic spheres and “subaltern counter-
publics” (Fraser 1992) related to the media, politics, aca-
demic institutions, and the everyday social world (for more 
details on our approach, see Huhn, Oettler, and Peetz 
2008). Our goal was to use multiple data sources to explore 
discursive fragments circulating within different public 
spheres (Oettler 2008), in particular in the media, the 
political arena, the academic and legal sphere, and daily 
life. The research data gathered included material from six 
Central American newspapers, speeches, publications of 
political parties and NGOs, ninety qualitative interviews, 
and 227 essays written by students from nine public, pri-
vate, and rural schools and a theater project. These essays 
1 Thanks to Jan Oettler (University of Regensburg) 
and Chris R. Smith (Earlham College) for providing 
useful comments. 
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were published as an edition that can serve as a primary 
source for scholarly research (Huhn, Oettler, and Peetz 
2007). In order to detect the macro-structure of the media 
discourse, we analyzed all issues of Al Día and La Nación 
(Costa Rica), El Diario de Hoy and La Prensa Gráfica (El 
Salvador), and El Nuevo Diario and La Prensa (Nicaragua) 
published in 2004, 2005, and 2006 (for an overview of the 
Central American print media and the marketing of crime, 
see Huhn, Oettler, and Peetz 2009).
This article is primarily concerned with the patterns of at-
tention associated with contemporary youth violence in 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua – three cases chosen 
for (1) a suspected similarity in the perception of insecur-
ity and (2) a variety of forms and contexts.2 In decon-
structing the undifferentiated image of a vulnerable region 
that suffers from escalating violence and juvenile delin-
quency, my goal is to explore national differences as well as 
varying threat levels and patterns of attention paid to these 
issues. My argument is that current Central American de-
bates on juvenile delinquency are closely intertwined with 
national myths, which provide citizens with a significant 
frame of meaning. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section briefly 
outlines the theoretical position and methodological ap-
proach of our research project. Rooted in the theoretical/
methodological framework of Critical Discourse Analysis, 
the project explores the “social construction of [violent] 
reality” (Berger and Luckmann 1966) at the local, national, 
and transnational levels. Powerful and less powerful speak-
ers in different discursive spaces tend to (re-)produce 
national myths. As “discourse is socially constitutive as well 
as socially shaped” (Fairclough and Wodack 1997, 258), the 
sections thereafter provide a brief historical overview of the 
evolution of political forces in Central America, revealing 
how national discourses on contemporary violence in 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, deal with the basic 
question: What factors underlie the understanding of 
youth gangs as one of the greatest problems for public se-
curity, or even national security? (for the concept of seguri-
dad ciudadana, see Peetz 2011). The last section explores 
the landscape of discursive and non-discursive arenas from 
a comparative perspective, trying to trace back the national 
and sub-national origins of this mobilizing myth. 
2. Violence Discourse and Mystification
As mentioned above, the research project aims to uncover 
the origins, development, and institutionalization of Cen-
tral American discourses on violence, rather than to iden-
tify the “real” magnitude of youth violence in Central 
America. When we began our exploration of the issue in 
2005, we compared current academic debates with our 
own field experiences in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Guatemala, and Nicaragua. From our point of view, there 
were two basic presumptions to be made when addressing 
Central American crime. First, the waves of criminal viol-
ence that followed the state terror, insurgent action, and 
war of the 1970s and 1980s did not spread to all countries 
at the same speed. While public life in El Salvador has been 
shaped by fear and criminal violence for more than a de-
cade (Cruz 1997, 2004), the level of attention to this issue 
in Costa Rica has only recently begun to rise (Huhn 2011). 
Second, the “real” level of crime is mostly unknown. 
Throughout Central America, criminal statistics are in-
complete, out of date, and, as a result, unreliable. As the 
state’s monopoly on the use of force is not fully functional 
in most Central American countries, the police and other 
state institutions are far from being omnipresent. Accord-
ing to Rodgers (2004, 117), many crimes are not registered 
in Nicaragua because the police are completely absent in 
over 20 percent of all municipalities. 
With regard to the quantitative measurement of crime, 
Huhn (2011) recently summarized the pivotal points of 
criticism, ranging from the unreported crime figures to the 
institutional capacity for receiving complaints, and from 
2 Central America encompasses a common history 
as well as a variety of national and local histories. 
Political turmoil and armed confrontation flour-
ished in these countries throughout the second half 
of the twentieth century, with Costa Rica being the 
sole exception. Democratization was achieved 
through civil war (Costa Rica, 1948), insurrection 
(Nicaragua I, 1979), election (Nicaragua II, 1990), 
military directive (El Salvador I, 1982), and peace 
negotiations (El Salvador II, 1992).
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crime investigations to translating these into accurate 
numbers. In general, criminal statistics reflect police ac-
tivity more than levels of violent crime: due to under- and 
over-reporting they deliver disproportional pictures of 
crime. Moreover, the political-publicist circle of intensifi-
cation (Scheerer 1978) “can be expanded by the crime rates 
themselves” (Huhn 2011, 137). 
Young (2004) highlights the paradox that many researchers 
are aware of the thin ice of data, but still keep on skating. 
While this in itself is a fundamental reason to reject crime 
statistics, there are further epistemic arguments for aban-
doning a positivist attitude. From a social constructivist 
perspective, criminal statistics are a specific instrument 
people use to make sense of their world. They reflect and 
(re)construct patterns of violent action. “But if the in-
formation they give on crime is restricted, they may never-
theless reveal other facts about the society that produces 
them” (Caldeira 2000, 106). Thus, Central American crimi-
nal statistics relate to hegemonic discourses on violence, 
with the police being one of the most powerful speakers in-
volved. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC), the homicide level in El Salvador is 
exceptionally high compared to Costa Rica and Nicaragua. 
Throughout Central America, reported homicides are in-
creasing.3 Are these data reflections of the “real” degree of 
fatal violence, or do they reflect crimes reported to the po-
lice and other government agencies? 
Although (organized) youth violence is unquestionably a 
significant pattern of violence in Central American so-
cieties, our findings suggest that the very perception of 
youth violence is tied to a multifaceted imagery. As an ex-
tension of the North American Crime Myth, the discourse 
on North American Transnational Youth Gangs (Johnson 
and Muhlhausen 2005) has swept through Central Ameri-
ca, producing the vivid myth of Central American youth 
gangs as a transnationally organized crime structure. From 
national and sub-national perspectives, then, this myth be-
comes off-centered, shifting from its transnational mean-
ing to diverse fields of national and local significance. 
Through my reading of Central American discourses on 
youth violence, I seek to explain what underlies the com-
mon understanding of pandillas or maras. The myth of 
youth gangs becomes a mobilizing myth if and only if it is 
tied to vital national myths. The myth of Costa Rica being 
the non-violent Latin American exception and the myth of 
Nicaragua being a safe country are key features of con-
temporary national debates. In El Salvador, on the other 
hand, the myth of a war-torn society being invaded by 
criminal adolescents permeates daily life. Although they 
may be obvious, it is important to highlight two key as-
pects of this particular case: First, El Salvador is a country 
highly affected by both criminal activity and street gangs. 
Second, the phenomenon of maras has undergone sig-
nificant changes in recent years, with youth gangs meta-
morphosing into organized criminal structures. At the 
same time, public politics changed from mano dura (iron 
fist) to efforts to combat organized crime, narcotics trade, 
and corruption. However, what does not fade is the initial 
perception of male, marginalized adolescents being “at 
risk.” In June 2011, President Funes presented his plan to 
introduce forced military service for “high-risk” teenagers 
(Prensa Libre, June 1, 2011).
What exactly does “myth” mean? A myth is a narrative 
synthesis of specific aspects of social life that is true for 
those who believe in it. The argument that crime myths 
create fear and justify repressive social control strategies is 
not new (Wright 1985; Ainsworth 2000; Garland 1996; Ro-
binson 2000). Crime myths often evolve from certain crime 
stories and then become both exaggerated and over-
generalized. In contrast to authors like Robinson (2000), 
who considers all crime myths to be untrue, I follow Katz’s 
argumentation (2003, 196):
Three features are salient in assessing whether a belief is a myth. 
First, myths are not necessarily false, they are ideas about mat-
ters that, under current states of evidence and by the use of the 
logic of empirical research, cannot be established as true or fal-
se. Second, myths are not just guesses about the unknown; they 
3 Intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants: 
Costa Rica: 6.4 (2002), 6.6 (2004), 8.0 (2006), 11.3 
(2010); El Salvador: 47.3 (2002), 64.6 (2004), 64.7 
(2006), 66.0 (2010); Nicaragua: 10.6 (2002), 12.1 
(2004), 13.1 (2006), 13.2 (2010); source: UNODC 
homicide data: www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/homicide.html.
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are beliefs that resonate deeply because they address immediate 
existential concerns that they would resolve with presumptions. 
Third, myths are not simply emotionally evocative fantasies 
about central matters; they are profoundly consequential for the 
distribution of power in society.
In defining deviant social groups, crime myths produce 
and reproduce patterns of social exclusion. This is espe-
cially true for the vivid image of monstrous youth gangs, 
which tends to dramatize and overgeneralize the problem 
of youth violence. This image is profoundly consequential 
for the identification of both problems to be solved and so-
cial groups to be targeted. What if gang violence is not the 
key problem, but rather elitist attitudes, gender-based viol-
ence, and/or corruption on a grand scale? If the Central 
American crime myth has spread throughout the region, 
however, it is just as likely that a “real” problem of youth 
violence may exist at the local level. But if this is the case, 
the perception of insecurity tends to be shaped by a larger 
process of mystification. What is felt in Central American 
neighbourhoods, as we shall see in the following, is both a 
reflection and further complication of the vivid image of 
monstrous youth gangs. 
3. El Salvador: The Mara Paradigm
Violence and repression shaped the history of twentieth-
century El Salvador. Since 1931, there have been six suc-
cessful military coups and numerous fraudulent elections, 
as well as short periods of democratic opening.4 From the 
late 1970s until January 1992, El Salvador experienced a 
guerrilla war between the Frente Farabundo Martí para la 
Liberación Nacional (FMLN) and the state. After the peace 
accords were signed, the FMLN became a political party 
and experienced factional splits as well as programmatic 
agreements. The record on implementation of the peace 
accords is mixed (Studemeister 2001; Zinecker 2004). Al-
though there have been positive achievements such as the 
demobilization of military and guerrilla forces, the sub-
ordination of the military to civilian authorities, and, most 
notably, the end of the war, the peace settlement has been 
“undermined by halfhearted compliance” (Karl 1995, 75) 
and “there also have been notorious deficiencies” (Cañas 
and Dada 1999, 73). The restoration of democratic rule in 
the 1980s was an “elite settlement” (Higley and Gunther 
1992), expressing the political project of “self-modernized” 
sectors of the Salvadorian oligarchy (Zinecker 2004, 25). 
The political system has been highly polarized for decades. 
“Ideology has been a major determinant of the vote in El 
Salvador ever since the first postconflict elections in 1994” 
(Azpuru 2010, 129).
After two decades of one-party rule by the Alianza Repub-
licana Nacionalista (ARENA), the 2009 presidential elec-
tions produced a victory for the FMLN. Mauricio Funes, a 
well-known journalist, was the first FMLN presidential 
candidate not to be a former guerrilla commander. During 
his campaign, Mauricio Funes used the Obama-style slo-
gan “Nace la Esperanza, viene el cambio” (Hope is born, 
change is coming) to indicate his moderate approach to 
national politics. Since taking office, President Funes has 
made broad-based economic growth, job creation, and 
fighting crime his top priorities.
At the time of our research, the debate on violence was in-
extricably linked to the issues of homicide and youth gangs 
and was severely limited by a national and international 
obsession with the latter. The question of “how the street 
gangs took Central America” (Arana 2005) had evolved to 
become the center of public debate, drawing attention and 
discussion away from the multifaceted character of viol-
ence (Huhn, Oettler, and Peetz 2008).
It is important to note that the current meaning of maras 
arose out of a complex and contradictory public process. 
Within a few years after the end of the war, public concern 
about delinquency and “low intensity peace” (Ribera 1997, 
128) had risen. In the mid-1990s, right-wing politicians ex-
ploited the issue, calling for tougher law enforcement and, 
particularly, the death penalty (Vickers 1999, 400). While 
the academic debate focused on the role of the media and 
psychosocial explanations for exploding homicide rates 
4  Mass violence dates back to 1932, when mili-
tary and paramilitary forces killed an estimated 
thirty thousand people in the wake of a peasant 
uprising, organized by local activists and members 
of the communist party (Dalton 1997, 163–220). 
The matanza is remembered as one of the main 
turning points of Salvadorian history (Martí i Puig 
2004, 54).
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(Armando González 1997; Cruz 1997), the maras were 
treated as a juvenile phenomenon rather than a threat to 
national security(Smutt and Miranda 1998, Cruz and Por-
tillo 1998). Within this particular context of political polar-
ization, statements on violence became increasingly 
focused on juvenile delinquency.
In July 2003, President Flores announced his anti-gang 
campaign, Plan Mano Dura (the “iron-fist” plan), centered 
around raids and detentions (Peetz 2011). One month 
later, according to El Nuevo Diario (August 23, 2003), the 
police had arrested 2,438 youths for having tattoos and for 
their style of dress, with 1,505 of them already having been 
released again. In October 2003, parliament passed the 
anti-gang law, which defined gang membership as a crime 
punishable by imprisonment. As the media began extensive 
coverage of the “total war” against youth gangs, repeatedly 
reporting on anti-gang efforts and crimes supposedly com-
mitted by gang members, the official electoral campaign 
started. During the first foro presidencial, a presidential 
campaign debate held in November 2003, Saca was asked: 
“Tony, why should the Salvadorans vote for Tony Saca?” In-
terestingly, while the ARENA candidate referred to honesty 
(“manos limpios”), freedoms (of expression, economic, re-
ligious), dialogue, and foreign investment, he did not men-
tion public security or anti-gang policies. However, later on 
in the campaign, ARENA disseminated a manifesto entitled 
País Seguro: Plan de Gobierno 2004–2009, in which the 
“iron fist” against youth gangs is portrayed as the most im-
portant emergency measure to be taken.5 As discourses on 
violence are, in Foucault’s words, “interlocking, hier-
archized, and all highly articulated around a cluster of 
power relations” (2006, 540), ARENA was able to restrict 
other representations of public insecurity. On the other 
hand, transnational networks of donor agencies and NGOs 
tend to play a critical role in defining political priorities 
and, thus, violent realities. The United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (UNDP) Society Without Violence 
Program, established in 1998, provided an important pub-
lic space in which the discourse on violence could flourish.6 
A number of conferences were held to cover topics such as 
prevention strategies, media representations of violence, 
and gender-based violence (PNUD 2004, 2006). However, 
some of these issues were overlooked in subsequent de-
bates. While they were not completely negated, they were 
relegated to discursive niches. One study, for instance, 
points out that Salvadorian newspapers “prioritize and ac-
centuate violent acts committed by maras and marginalize 
information related to violence against women” (translated 
from Las Dignas 2006, 25).
As our qualitative data indicate, the awareness of daily inse-
curity tends to be multifaceted, with the hegemonic dis-
course on youth violence being questioned and other forms 
of violence being perceived as an imminent threat, albeit 
with varying degrees of sincerity. A paramedic told us:
And nowadays, well, in quotation marks, we live a peace process 
after an armed conflict, but with regard to violence, it has not 
been contained, and I’m not only talking about the situation of 
armed violence, in the typical case of, let’s call them, social 
groups, mistakenly called maras and all that, but rather there is 
domestic violence, there is violence in the streets, there is traffic 
violence, there is violence of all kinds, so we are not just trans-
porting people assaulted by non-legal armed people [gente ar-
mada no legal] but we are bringing in children who have been 
mistreated by their parents, women who have been mistreated 
by their husbands, and we are even getting to a point where 
men are also mistreated by their wives [laughter]. (Interview, El 
Salvador, December 7, 2006)
As described above, the 2004 electoral campaign was the 
central point from which the discourse on organized and 
monstrous youth violence emanated. However, the mano 
dura policy was not the only feature of the electoral pro-
cess. The media and ARENA also stoked fears of commu-
nism, trying to establish a relationship between the FMLN 
and international terrorism. Moreover, the media high-
lighted the US administration’s preoccupation with leftist 
5 Only one type of perpetrator is specified in the 
text: “The minor law-breaker and young adult in 
conflict with the law,” “the youths” and “the maras.” 
When referring to delinquency and crime less con-
cretely, perpetrators are not specifically mentioned.
6 In 2005 and 2006, the programme implemented 
an Arms-Free Municipalities Project in two pilot 
municipalities, San Martín and Ilopango.
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governments, suggesting the possibility of deportations 
and the drying up of remittances, the financial lifeline that 
still keeps the Salvadorian economy running. The mano 
dura thus began to form an integral part of ARENAís rhe-
torical repertoire, but was not the only strategy used.7
In the Salvadorian case, the entrepreneurial sector is key for 
both political agenda setting and policy formulation. While 
the Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada (ANEP) 
was participating in bodies such as the National Commis-
sion on Citizen Security and Social Peace, the right-wing 
think tank FUSADES has propagated a specific under-
standing of what is threatening to investors. FUSADES, far 
from restricting its debate to “iron fist” policies, proposes a 
catalogue of measures that includes small arms control, law 
enforcement, prevention, rehabilitation, and institution 
building (Pleitez Chávez 2006). Thus, the more sophis-
ticated concept of the enemy, as applied by Mauricio Funes, 
is also backed by the most powerful sector of Salvadorian 
society. In recent years, we have witnessed an elite discourse 
shifting from obsession with maras to a more multifaceted 
threat analysis. On a national level, the fear of marginalized 
youth has given way to the fear of organized crime. In his 
second anniversary address, Funes identified insecurity and 
low productivity as the main obstacles to development (La 
Prensa Gráfica, June 2, 2011). However, as many com-
mentators noted, the president failed to touch on the social 
roots of insecurity: the neoliberal model.
Altogether, the image of monstrous youth gangs had a pro-
found effect on the political trajectory in post-conflict El 
Salvador. In this process, policy makers did not simply 
react to a given problem. Instead, they proactively identi-
fied and prioritized the problem of juvenile delinquency. 
With the transformation of policy goals into repressive 
anti-gang policy, Salvadorian policy makers introduced a 
“punitive populism” (Wolf 2009, 88) that ultimately 
proved counterproductive. Although the change of govern-
ment had a visible impact on agenda-setting, the overall 
fear of youth is unlikely to disappear.
4. Nicaragua: Contested Evidence on Insecurity
In contrast to El Salvador, popular uprising and guerrilla 
warfare were successful in Nicaragua. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, the idea of building a trans-isthmian 
canal had increased U.S. attention to the region. The fol-
lowing decades were marked by long periods of U.S. mili-
tary occupation of Nicaragua (1909–1919, 1912–1925, 
1926–1933) and a guerrilla uprising headed by Augusto 
César Sandino. In the early 1930s, U.S. troops withdrew 
and gave way to the Somoza dynasty that was to rule the 
country for almost fifty years. 
As mentioned above, democracy came through insurrec-
tion. After their revolutionary triumph in July 1979, the 
Sandinistas encouraged a mixed economy and carried out 
national crusades against illiteracy and disease. It is im-
portant to recognize that the “first half decade of Sandinis-
ta rule … featured experimentation, innovation, and some 
significant success in the area of politics” (Walker 2000, 
74). Espousing an ideological mélange or “sincretismo 
político” (Cardenal 2004, 540), the Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional (FSLN) fostered a system of mass or-
ganizations, with the Comités de Defensa Sandinista 
(CDR) being among the most grassrooted organizations. 
They functioned both as local administrative units for food 
distribution and as neighborhood vigilancias (vigilance 
committees). 
Although the second half of the Sandinistas’ rule 
(1985–1990) saw important political achievements (con-
stitutional process, elections), this period was shaped by 
the Contra War and the steady decline of both the econ-
omy and social programs, as well as a reversal of the gains 
in participatory democracy (Figueroa Ibarra 1993, 68–78, 
Walker 2000, 76–77, Prevost 1997, 154–55). Soon after its 
electoral defeat in 1990, the FSLN experienced internal 
struggles and organized Sandinista civil society imploded 
(Polakoff and La Ramée 1997).8 Since the late 1990s, Nica-
raguan politics has been severely constricted by the pacto, a 
power-sharing pact between Daniel Ortega (FSLN) and 
7  For more information about the 2006 electoral 
process, see Guzmán, Peraza, and Rivera (2006).
8 The Movimiento de Renovación Sandinista 
(MRS) broke away from the FSLN in 1995, on the 
grounds that the political stance of the post-insur-
rectionist FSLN was dominated by the authoritarian 
pragmatism of Daniel Ortega, oscillating between 
cooperation and confrontation (Close 2005, 123).
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then head of state Arnoldo Alemán (Partido Liberal Con-
stitucionalista, PLC). Even after Alemán was convicted of 
corruption in 2003, the pacto permitted president Bolaños 
little room for leadership. Together with Cardinal Obando 
y Bravo, head of the Nicaraguan Catholic Church, Ortega 
and Alemán formed a powerful triumvirate, corrupting de-
mocratic governance. 
In the 2006 presidential elections, former president Daniel 
Ortega (1985–1990) was reelected with 37.99 percent of the 
vote. Since then, he has managed to bridge the gap between 
the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade 
Agreement (DR-CAFTA) and the Bolivarian Alliance for 
the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), proposed by the Vene-
zuelan government. Ortega introduced new anti-poverty 
programs and centralized power. His government’s active 
efforts to “monarchize and privatize the state” (Rocha 
2010) have caused severe friction within Nicaraguan so-
ciety. At the time of writing, voters had just elected Ortega 
for a fourth term, ignoring the constitution’s term limits.
In Nicaragua, the importance of insecurity in public dis-
course is much more difficult to ascertain. Until 2006, pub-
lic life in Nicaragua was overshadowed by an elite discourse 
that described Nicaragua as a safe country (Rocha 2005). 
On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
National Police, President Bolaños reported on the state of 
(in)security: “The citizen security we have achieved is envi-
able, it is beginning to constitute a legend in Latin Ameri-
ca” (translated from La Prensa, August 6, 2004). On the 
same occasion, the head of the National Police, Edwin Cor-
dero, referred to a decline in youth gangs (pandillas) and 
traffic accidents, saying that the police had achieved success 
both in combating the sale of illegal drugs and in establish-
ing a network of women’s police stations. A consultant 
working for a powerful semi-state consulting agency in Ni-
caragua told us:
Nicaragua is one of the most secure countries in Central Ameri-
ca. … yes, you notice security more in the urban part, in the ru-
ral part it is a bit more complicated, or in the poorest sectors of 
Nicaragua, or in the poor neighborhoods in Managua, you sen-
se a bit more insecurity, because, OK, maybe it’s a bit, well, 
maybe a bit strange, but, yes there are some hold-ups among the 
poorest people. (Interview, Nicaragua, December 14, 2006)
This image was reinforced by high-ranking police officials, 
who repeatedly claimed that “criminal violence is mini-
mal” (Rocha 2005, 5). Given this image of Nicaragua as a 
safe country, most of the presidential candidates avoided 
the issue of violence during the 2006 electoral campaign. 
However, the FSLN presidential candidate Daniel Ortega, 
who refused to participate in pre-electoral “bourgeois” 
media events, addressed his electorate by touring the 
country and via party structures. His entourage touched 
upon the major preoccupations of poor people, including 
insecurity and the supply of electricity. Douglas Pérez, 
National Coordinator of the Communal Movement, stated: 
Adolescents are generally criminalized, and the problem comes 
from the system … we want a government that … like we have 
been in the 1980s. (translated from FSLN 2006) 
In general, our findings suggest that Nicaragua was a dis-
cursively divided country in 2006, with total insecurity and 
unrestricted freedom forming antithetical public per-
ceptions. It is crucial to point out that the image of Nicara-
gua as a safe country was produced not only by members 
of the elite, but also by people belonging to the lower strata 
of society. A well-educated employee of the security com-
pany ULTRANIC stated that Nicaragua
is sane, relatively sane; of course, there are incidents … Here it 
[the problem] is small, because it is a small country, everybody 
knows each other, the capital does not provide the conditions 
for gangs to organize. (Interview, Nicaragua, November 24, 
2006)
Many Nicaraguans perceive crime as something imported 
or happening elsewhere. “Aquí es sano, pero …” (here it is 
same, but …) is a phrase often heard in Nicaragua, and also 
in other Central American countries. On the other hand, 
large sectors of society perceive violent crime as an import-
ant problem affecting the country. The “talk of crime” 
often focuses on the poor, and some of our interviewees 
stated that criminal behavior is a rational choice made by 
people facing famine wages and “condiciones muy jodidas 
de trabajo” (very fucked up working conditions) (theater 
educator, Nicaragua, October 25, 2006). The latest IEEPP 
opinion poll (2010, 13–15) shows that 77.7 percent of re-
spondents perceived ordinary crime as the main problem 
of insecurity. 38.4 percent referred to youth violence, and 
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31.1 percent to gender-based violence. Interestingly, 65.6 
percent of the respondents identified insecurity as a con-
sequence of unemployment. In general, the Nicaraguan 
public debate on insecurity tends to address socio-
economic causes, with the lack of prospects at the center of 
many statements on the crime situation. However, there are 
conflicting views on the magnitude of youth violence.
First, the National Police celebrates a successful deacti-
vation of pandillas. In a recent report, the police identify 
twenty youth gangs (pandillas juveniles) with 369 members 
and 163 at-risk juvenile peer-groups (grupos juveniles en 
alto riesgo social). Moreover, the police claim to have “re-
integrated” 3,979 adolescents between 2002 and 2007 (see 
also La Prensa, February 26, 2010, and October 23, 2010).
Second, some analysts state that Nicaraguan pandillas were 
“metamorphosing into a drug institution” (Rodgers 2008, 
84). According to Oscar Bonilla, director of the Salvadorian 
National Council for Public Security, Nicaragua has already 
imported the brutal Mara Dieciocho and Salvatrucha from 
Central Americaís northern triangle – El Salvador, Guate-
mala, and Honduras (CENIDH 2010, 71, see also La Pren-
sa, April 21, 2010).
Third, there is a growing concern about the manipulation 
of pandillas for political purposes. As mentioned above, 
Ortega’s return to power has been accompanied by grow-
ing repression, including police raids, criminal charges, and 
harassment of prominent opposition figures and Sandinis-
ta dissidents like Ernesto Cardenal, Mónica Baltodrano, 
Carlos Fernando Chamorro, and Dora Maria Tellez. After 
the 2008 municipal elections, political demonstrations 
were met with violence. “Meanwhile, bands of young San-
dinista-linked thugs, claiming to be the ‘owners of the 
streets,’‚ attacked demonstrators while the police stood idly 
by’ (Burbach 2009, 37; see also CENIDH 2010, 65–66). 
Vilma Núñez, director of the Nicaraguan Center for 
Human Rights (CENIDH), declared that the adolescents 
were manipulated by the government (La Prensa, Nov-
ember 9, 2009). The adolescents were supplied with 
weapons, food, and bus fares. As Rocha notes, “the aggres-
sion was produced by and in the context of an absence of 
political and social morality” (2008). Most strikingly, it re-
mains unclear whether these adolescents were actually gang 
members or not.
5. Costa Rica: Crime and Moral Decline
Following the annulment of presidential election results in 
March 1948, Costa Rica experienced a short civil war, 
which brought José Figueres into power. Since then, the 
political system has displayed great stability, based on a 
party system effectively dominated by two parties, the Par-
tido Liberación Nacional (PLN) and the Partido Unidad 
Social Cristiana (PUSC). A commitment to democracy, the 
abolition of the army, and the “Bismarckian character of 
the Costa Rican state” (Davis, Aguilar, and Speer 1999, 43) 
have become core features of national identity. In contrast 
to other Central American countries, non-communist 
political society has been embedded into an institutional 
setting characterized by a high level of political freedom. If 
the second half of the twentieth century was characterized 
by the consolidation of democracy and organized civil so-
ciety (Davis, Aguilar, and Speer 1999, 44), the turn of the 
millennium witnessed a significant change. The “transition 
to neoliberalism” (Booth 2000, 101) of the late 1980s im-
plied the replacement of the social democratic model with 
structural adjustment and cutbacks in social security, edu-
cation, and health. While political decision-making was 
dominated by decrees, voters were faced with the increas-
ing “sameness of the PLN and PUSC” (Booth 2000, 96). 
The 2006 election returned Óscar Arias (PLN), the presi-
dent and famous Nobel Laureate, to office but brought the 
bipartisan model to an end.9 In 2010, Minister of Justice 
Laura Chinchilla (PLN) won the presidential elections. 
In contrast to El Salvador and Nicaragua, political parties 
and decision-making bodies in Costa Rica tend to highlight 
9  Surprisingly, the Partido Acción Ciudadana 
(PAC), founded in 2000 by Ottón Solís, received 38.9 
percent of the vote, and the PUSC suffered a dev-
astating defeat, winning only 3.5 percent. The “new-
comerís” appeal to the electorate was successful be-
cause he presented the PAC as a force opposing free 
trade and corruption. 
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the very perception of insecurity as a major problem. The 
“real” level of crime and the perception of insecurity are 
often discussed as two sides of the same coin. For instance, 
the final document of the PLN party congress in May 2005 
and the forty-nine-page PLN Programa de Gobierno 
2006–2010 both refer to a dramatic increase in violence 
and insecurity, linked to a persistent fear of crime. The 
PLN proposed to “stop the increase in delinquency and re-
duce the acute perception of insecurity that is currently a 
burden on the Costa Rican population” (translated from 
PLN 2006, 24). In recent years, the twofold problem of in-
creasing crime and increasing fear has been perceived as 
one of the main obstacles to human development in Costa 
Rica. Notably, awareness of rising insecurity has circulated 
within the realm of academic debates linked to inter-
national organizations (Proyecto Estado de La Nación 
2000, PNUD 2005, Rico 2006).
However, it appears that the twofold problem of increasing 
crime and fear was not at the center of the electoral process 
in 2006. While the electoral platforms of both the PAC and 
the PLN included the issue of insecurity, promising an “in-
tegral-preventive vision” (PAC 2006), the strengthening of 
the police, and the recovery of values and norms, media 
debates focused on free trade, privatization, the social sys-
tem, and, most notably, the personalities of the presidential 
candidates. The issue of violent crime entered the stage in 
2010. During the presidential campaign, Minister of Justice 
Laura Chinchilla emphasized conservative sexual policies 
as well as the promotion of free trade and foreign invest-
ment. However, her top priority was the improvement of 
public security and, especially, the introduction of new 
anti-crime policies.
In Costa Rica, the increase in crime is not perceived as 
being explosive in nature, but rather as being linked to a 
steady socio-economic decline since the mid-1980s. It is 
important to note that a perceived or real dramatic increase 
in robberies has emerged as a thematic node associated 
with other leitmotifs such as drug consumption and moral 
decline (Rico 2006, 17, 25–26). The issue of “ordinary viol-
ence” is not treated prominently in La Nación, but where it 
is addressed, it is treated intensively (Huhn, Oettler, and 
Peetz 2009). Media reports reflect an ongoing concern that 
the country is facing a permanent decline linked to a de-
terioration of the foundations of the social security system 
and the social fabric of society. By attributing crime to 
moral decline, La Nación, as well as other important voices, 
establishes an argument that leads to the stigmatization of 
youth. Consider, for example, Ottón Solís’s Convocatoria a 
la Ciudadanía. In this document, the PAC associates crime 
and insecurity with social exclusion, loss of solidarity, im-
punity and corruption, the transnationalization of organ-
ized crime, and “domestic violence, especially violence 
against women” (PAC 2006, 43–44). The chapter on inse-
curity culminates in a statement on rehabilitation measures 
with infractores (lawbreakers), “children and adolescents 
with criminal behavior,” “youth gangs” (pandillas juve-
niles), and “marginalized youth from rural and urban 
areas” as the focus groups. How does the diagnosis of crime 
symptoms translate into the definition of perpetrators to 
be reintegrated into society? It is crucial to note that the 
Costa Rican “talk of crime” is not a discussion about youth 
gangs, but rather a conversation about moral decline, with 
the (imagined) criminal behavior of adolescents serving as 
a vivid leitmotif.
6. Organized Youth Violence as a Discursive Node
Members of the political establishment and international 
think tank researchers play a key role in the process 
through which the meaning of youth gangs (pandillas, 
maras) is progressively created. The life-threatening scen-
ario of brutal and hierarchical gang culture, however, 
evolves into something more fluid as we take other public 
realms into account.
In general, “fear of youth” is not necessarily linked to life-
world experiences. This is best explained with an example. 
Our data set, gathered in 2006, includes 226 essays written 
by students from rural and urban, marginal and upper 
middle-class schools (Huhn, Oettler, and Peetz 2007). The 
survey was carried out in two steps. The first question was 
not directly linked to problems of crime, violence, and inse-
curity but allowed for a variety of answers: “Imagine you 
were the president of the country. What are the country’s 
most important problems and how would you solve them?” 
The second question referred directly to lifeworld experi-
ence: “Do you feel secure in your family/neighborhood/vil-
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lage/town/country? Why? Why not?” The students’ essays 
show that there are national differences in the perception of 
threats (Peetz 2011). 80 percent of the Salvadorian students 
identified problems related to violence, crime, and (physi-
cal) insecurity as major problems of their country, com-
pared to 67 percent of the Costa Rican students and 25.6 
percent of the Nicaraguan students. There is a correlation 
between print media discourses and students’ perception, 
with the latter differing from “real” crime rates. Fur-
thermore, our data indicate that the image of youth gangs is 
connected to class and patterns of social exclusion. In their 
answers to the open question that was not directly related 
to violence, sixteen (out of nineteen) Salvadorian upper-
middle-class students mentioned youth violence as a major 
problem of the country, while only thirty-four (out of fifty-
two) students from Salvadorian urban public schools 
identified issues related to crime and violence as important 
problems. Are students from an upper middle-class social 
background – which, in San Salvador includes certain stan-
dards of private security – more sensitive to crime problems 
than their marginalized peers? Our data indicate that the 
latter tend to stress other issues such as poverty, inequality, 
and joblessness. Most interestingly, however, only four (out 
of nineteen) Salvadorian students from private schools 
mentioned youth violence as a problem related to their own 
personal security. In contrast, thirty-four (out of fifty-two) 
students from marginalized urban schools considered 
youth violence to have an effect on their own lives. This in-
dicates that even in marginalized neighborhoods, fear of 
youth gangs seems not to be omnipresent. 
The image of maras, however, evokes feelings of fear that 
have gradually become internalized. This image of organized 
youth violence has emerged as a symbol for social deterio-
ration and exploding crime rates. Our interviewees often 
drew on this symbol of the mara when they were asked to 
compare the current situation with the past or to comment 
on the statement that Central America is one of the most vi-
olent regions of the world. A Costa Rican priest stated:
Yes, I think so [that Central America is one of the most violent 
regions of the world], yes I think so. In other Central American 
countries, it is worse and, for example, in El Salvador the maras, 
it’s terrible, it’s terrible. (Interview, Costa Rica, November 4, 
2006)
A taxi driver from El Salvador said:
And what we have here is violence, nothing but violence, and I 
think that you will eliminate this violence only if you eliminate 
these maras. (Interview, El Salvador, November 28, 2006)
A female cook:
Yes, I think so, El Salvador is the country that has more vio-
lence, more assassinations, rapes for nothing, they kill people 
without any reason, they assault people without any reason be-
cause there are many mareros and many delinquents. I think, 
yes, El Salvador has more delinquency. (Interview, El Salvador, 9 
December 2006)
It is important to note that the cook identifies two groups 
of perpetrators, mareros and delinquents, and presumes 
them to be guilty of a variety of crimes. Although most in-
terviewees also refer to other groups of perpetrators and 
other violent settings including, for instance, school mass-
acres in the United States, the war in Iraq, suicide bombers, 
Colombian mass violence, and insecurity in Somalia, it ap-
pears that the very notion of maras provides a strong ar-
gument.
In recent years, the concept of pandillas/maras has entered 
the political vocabulary. As political decision-makers, 
among them presidents, members of parliament, and in-
ternational consultants, have begun to turn their attention 
towards public security, youth gangs have increasingly 
been labeled as the perpetrator par excellence. It is crucial 
to underline, however, that the political intentions and 
socio-economic settings have differed from country to 
country.
According to Rocha, various factors have contributed to 
the identification of Nicaraguan youth gangs as a major 
target group to be reached by policy interventions. What 
has mattered most is the transformation of the Sandinista 
police into the National Police. The existence of parallel 
Sandinista and traditional elite networks within the 
National Police “has generated different discourses and ac-
tions towards youth violence” (Rocha 2005, 12), with 
powerful international donor agencies such as the Inter-
American Development Bank contributing to making the 
rehabilitation/prevention of youth violence a major prior-
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ity.10 In general, it appears that Nicaraguan decision-
makers use efforts to reintegrate so-called “young people 
at risk” as a marker of difference, and something that indi-
cates the democratic nature of Nicaraguan politics. They 
also take up arguments that are circulating in other 
spheres of public life in Nicaragua. After the Sandinistas’ 
electoral defeat in 1990, NGOs dealing with child pro-
tection appeared throughout the country. The Instituto de 
Promoción Humana-Estelí (INPRHU-Estelí), the Centro 
de Prevención de la Violencia (CEPREV), and the Funda-
ción de Protección de los Derechos de Niños, Niñas y Ado-
lescentes Infractores de la Ley (FUNPRODE) are some of 
the most important Nicaraguan NGOs working with 
“adolescents at risk.” All share the characteristic of being 
dependent on foreign financial resources. A second, and 
more important, shared feature is participation in trans-
national advocacy networks. Since the ideas of inter-
national consultants, Nicaraguan decision-makers, and 
NGO activists complement one another, the notion of 
youth violence has emerged as a substantial issue in public 
spheres.
In contrast to Nicaragua, the networked, organized civil so-
ciety in El Salvador has been an ineffective counterweight 
to official agenda-setting and thus not a policy multiplier. 
While ARENA has used the mara label as a meta-symbol 
for evil, trying to establish the idea of close ties between 
maras, Jihadist terrorism, and the FMLN, the latter has cir-
cumnavigated the issue of youth violence, focusing instead 
on power relations and the socio-economic dimensions of 
development. Given the high degree of political polar-
ization, the discursive power of organized civil society has 
been severely limited for a long time. Since anti-gang po-
licies have been adopted, human rights organizations, 
churches, universities, and non-organized professionals 
have criticized the state for violating human rights and 
exaggerating the problem of youth violence. Backed by in-
ternational NGOs and intergovernmental organizations, 
organized civil society has sought to establish a counter-
weight to official statements. In general, critical views on 
repressive anti-gang rhetoric can be articulated, but they 
tend to be ignored by the mass media. Recently, however, 
U.S. and Colombian “success” stories appear to have cre-
ated renewed interest in the promotion of alternative anti-
crime strategies by the business sector, regardless of 
whether or not these strategies are repressive. Certain inter-
ventions by FUSADES (see above) signaled a strategic shift 
from “iron fist” policies to more comprehensive anti-crime 
policies.
In Costa Rica, the stigmatization of youth has not yet been 
translated into policy. Rather, the classification of youth as 
the social group most susceptible to crime and anti-social 
behavior corresponds to the widespread perception that 
Costa Rica is facing a moral decline. The 2005 PLN elec-
toral platform includes a similar argument, stating that 
Costa Rica is suffering from a norms and identity crisis. 
Therefore, state policies should “promote generation res-
cue, inspired by new principles and norms, creating the 
conditions for a renewed culture of social cohabitation that 
allows for the reversal of the observed tendencies” (trans-
lated from PLN 2005, item 151). Why is a generation to be 
rescued? Or, in other words, why do strategies designed to 
prevent crime overlook adult criminals and violators and 
refer solely to the imagined perpetrators of tomorrow? As 
described above, adolescents at risk tend to be the only 
group of perpetrators that is named.
In conclusion, as explained above, public discourses on 
youth violence differ from country to country, with im-
portant thematic nodes linked to their respective political 
history. The seed of fear is not automatically nourished by 
“real” violent incidents but rather by discursive events. 
Moreover, we have shown that the public discourse on viol-
ence is not a monolithic phenomenon, but rather a series 
of overlapping or contradictory discourses emanating from 
a variety of hegemonic publics and “counter-publics” 
(Fraser 1992).
10 A variety of institutions dealing with youth viol-
ence and/or “young people at risk“ have been estab-
lished since the late 1990s, with the National Secre-
tary of Youth Affairs (Secretaría de la Juventud) and 
the Special Ombudsmanís Office for Children and 
Adolescents (Procuradoría Especial de la Niñez y la 
Adolescencia) being the most important.
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7. Conclusion
The argument that there are discrepancies between the 
portrayal of monstrous Central American youth gangs and 
social reality is not new. Previous writings have highlighted 
the complex and often dispersed nature of the Central 
American gang phenomenon:
While there is no doubt that a significant proportion of regional 
violence is attributable to the phenomenon, gangs are relatively 
local-level security issues rather than the transnational threat 
that the media and some policy outlets make them out to be. 
(Rodgers, Muggah, and Stevenson 2009, 23).
The combination of scant empirical evidence and drama-
tizing reports has fostered the spread of myths about or-
ganized youth violence: (1) youth violence is exploding; (2) 
North American transnational youth gangs have “growing 
tentacles” (Muhlhausen 2005); and (3) Central American 
neighborhoods are struck with fear. 
There are, however, significant discrepancies here. Our quali-
tative data indicate that national discourses on violence are 
intrinsically tied to national myths. The myth of Costa Rica 
being a “peace-loving nation” (Huhn 2009), the myth of pre-
Ortega Nicaragua being a secure country (Oettler 2009), and 
the myth of El Salvador being invaded by criminal adoles-
cents (and, more recently, by mafia organizations) are key 
features of contemporary national debates. In Central Ameri-
ca the diverging paths of development seem to converge in 
terms of crime policy. The three cases discussed in this paper 
encompass countries with high and medium human devel-
opment (Costa Rica vs. El Salvador and Nicaragua), countries 
with and without a recent history of internal war (El Salvador 
and Nicaragua vs. Costa Rica) and countries with crime rates 
usually perceived as exploding (El Salvador), increasing 
(Costa Rica) or low (Nicaragua). These contextual features 
may best be understood as a complex matrix that affects dis-
course content indirectly, allowing for overlapping or even 
contradictory messages. Irrespective of national differences, 
however, Central American crime myths are created and per-
petuated mainly by mass media, politicians, and social scien-
tists and serve to justify elitist status quo politics.
On the other hand, it is crucial to note that Central America 
is a “bounded system” (Stake 2000), an interdependent con-
figuration of societies characterized by porous borders. 
There is a cross-national discursive leitmotif focusing on 
the ever-present danger of youth violence, moral decline, 
and social disintegration. The notion of organized youth vi-
olence has become a central feature of both national and in-
ternational debates on violent Central American “realities.” 
The vivid image of monstrous youth gangs is widespread 
but by no means automatically associated with lifeworld 
experience or sufficient empirical evidence. The talk of in-
tentional crime, whether regarding homicide or organized 
youth violence, is by no means the only talk of violence 
found in public spheres in Central America (Moodie 2010; 
Hume 2008). What matters to many of our interviewees 
are issues related to large-scale corruption, structural viol-
ence, and/or gender-based violence (Huhn 2009; Peetz 
2011; Huhn, Oettler, and Peetz 2007). The talk of crime is 
performed within ever-shifting intersections of ethnicity, 
class, and gender (see Anderson, Hill, and Collins 2001; 
Johnson 2001). Moreover, public spheres are often divided 
along residential lines. Various domains of oppression and 
privilege come together in the rhetoric of (in)security, . As 
our data indicate, the “talk of crime” (Caldeira 2000) 
serves to create and perpetuate a patchwork of inequalities. 
There are, for instance, white female NGO activists who re-
produce prejudices against the poor. There are people from 
poor neighborhoods who identify other poor neigh-
borhoods as the danger spots, and there are machos from 
all strata of society laden with prejudices against women. 
On the other hand, there are men who communicate fem-
inist messages and people from poor neighborhoods who 
demystify the image of the dangerous poor. And, of course, 
there are white feminists engaged in the struggle against 
prejudice. Thus, it is crucial to recognize that discourses on 
violence are plurivocal and often ambiguous, with a wide 
range of speakers bound to different public realms. Per-
ceptions of insecurity are closely tied to a matrix of privi-
lege and discrimination, with income, gender, sexual 
orientation, and residential background being important, 
albeit not determinative, factors affecting fear.
The perception of youth violence is multifaceted, with 
cross-sectoral and cross-border discursive strings as well as 
national and subnational peculiarities. As Downs pointed 
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out thirty years ago, every problem of crucial importance 
to society “leaps into prominence, remains there for a short 
time, and then – though still largely unresolved – gradually 
fades from the center of public attention” (1998, 100). In 
public discourse, though, issues come and go in public at-
tention. According to Downs, the “issue attention cycle” 
usually begins with a series of dramatic events resulting in 
“alarmed discovery” and “euphoric enthusiasm” that the 
problem can be quickly solved (ibid.). Applying this con-
cept to the intertwined Central American cases, we can 
identify different stages of national agenda-setting and po-
licy formulation. While the problem of youth violence is 
still leaping into prominence in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 
it is already fading from the center of public attention in El 
Salvador. Nevertheless, the iconographic image of mon-
strous youth gangs that originate in marginalized neigh-
borhoods will have an enduring effect on collective 
memory. In Enteman’s words: “even a million words may 
not be able to undo the negative impacts of a single bad 
picture” (2003, 27). The picture of gang members with 
their tattooed faces and torsos will endure as long as “ado-
lescents at risk” are seen as a menace to the social order. 
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